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Introduction
Although tax policy debates are a never-ending source of amusement and
frustration, recent years have witnessed a shift in the tenor of such
discussions. In particular, serious consideration is now given to proposals that
would not just modify the existing tax system, but rather completely replace
major components of the federal tax system with new consumption-based
taxes.1 Most such proposals would eliminate federal. individual and corporate
income taxes and the federal estate tax and establish in their place a new
2 4national retail sales tax, also called value-added tax (VAT) , "flat tax," or
"USA" tax.
5
Clearly, the income tax as we know it suffers from significant problems.
Broadly speaking, the extant system is thought to be overly complex, unfair,
and not conducive to good economic performance. 6 These concerns have
existed for a long time, however, and have plausibly declined in import over
the last two decades. 7 Thus, while these concerns are very real, the recent
political fervor over fundamental reform may be attributed, at least in part, to
factors other than problems with the income tax. It is possible, of course, that
such critiques are motivated by an effort to shrink government by attacking its
revenue source, though the effort to reduce government by shifting to simpler,
more efficient tax systems could actually backfire.8 At least some of the focus
t Joseph A. Pechman Fellow, The Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.,
Washington, D.C. I thank David Bradford, Michael Graetz, and Eric Toder for helpful comments and
Stacie Carney for outstanding research assistance. The opinions offered are solely my own and should
not be ascribed to the officers, trustees, or staffofthe Brookings Institution.
1. For a partial listing of such proposals, see Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale, Fundamental
Tax Reform: Miracle or Mirage?, in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: BUDGET CHOICES FOR THE NEXT
CENTURY 235, 235 n. I (Robert D. Reischauer ed., 1997); David F. Bradford, Consumption Taxes: Some
Fundamental Transition Issues, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 124 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1995).
2. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 212 (1997)
(chapter on "The Flat Tax, the 'USA' Tax, and Other Uncommon Consumption Taxes").
3. See, e.g., id.
4. See, e.g., id.
5. See, e.g., id. at 214.
6. See, e.g., William G. Gale, Building a Better Tax System, BROOKINGS REv. 19, 21-23 (1995).
7. See infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
8. Theoretical arguments and empirical estimates establish the possibility that a well-functioning
tax system makes it politically easier to expand the size of government. Becker and Mulligan, for
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is purely political; bashing the tax system (and the IRS) is often good politics
regardless of the actual merit of the proposed reforms. 9
As a result, no current (or even recent) policy debate contains rhetoric that
is so overblown and so weakly related to reality as that of tax reform. Tax
reform proponents often tell us that a new tax system would be incredibly
simple, 10 would eliminate lobbyists and tax politics," would be fair, 12 and
would generate massive economic growth.' 3  Despite these gross
oversimplifications by advocates, comprehensive tax reform is a complex and
subtle subject.
The purpose of Michael Graetz's book, The Decline (and Fall?) of the
Income Tax, 14 is to tackle this subject head on. The majority of Graetz's book
is a careful and nuanced diagnosis of the problem. Graetz examines the
strengths and weaknesses of the existing tax system, linking them to the
history and politics of tax policy. This is no small or unimportant task:
Understanding the claims and mistakes of the past as well as the political
constraints placed on tax policy is a requisite prelude to intelligent tax reform.
Graetz also suggests his own reform. Specifically, he proposes to
implement a national, broad-based VAT similar to European VAT taxes.
Individual income tax would be substantially revised to completely exempt
low- and middle-income households and to tax high-income households at a
relatively low, flat rate. The corporate tax rate would be cut in half.
It would be a mistake, however, to consider Graetz's book simply as a
platform for advocating this proposal. The proposal is made almost
sheepishly; in fact, it is first mentioned on page 262 and only four or five
pages are devoted to supporting explanations and details. Thus, while the
example, provide an intriguing analysis of this idea. See Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, The
Endogenous Determination of Time Preference, 112 Q.J. ECON. 729-58 (1997). Even the creators of the
so-called flat tax, Hall and Rabushka, note that such tax "could make it easier to expand government."
ROBERT HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX 48 (2d ed. 1995). This is the type of thinking that is
rumored to have led Milton Friedman to conclude that the only good tax is a bad tax. See also Per
Krusell et al., Are Consumption Taxes Really Better Than Income Taxes?, 37 J. MONETARY ECON. 475
(1996) (using political models to predict that income taxes will tend to be lower, and therefore that
median voters will not benefit from consumption taxes).
9. See, e.g., National GOP Banking on Tax Issue to Keep Majority Restraint, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Oct. 22, 1997, at AI3; Tom Raum, Finding Fault with the IRS Is the Easy Part, PEORIA J.
STAR, Sept. 26, 1997, at Al; William M. Welch & Susan Page, Tax Reform Gets a New Supporter:
White House Climbs on Bandwagon, USA TODAY, Oct. 1, 1997, at 6A.
10. See, e.g., Americans for Fair Taxation (visited Apr. 26, 1998) <http://www.fairtax.org/
home.html>; Dick Armey, The Doctor Is In-Flat Tax: Tax Season Survival Kit (visited Apr. 26, 1998)
<http://freedom.house.gov/survival/flattax.asp>.
11. See, e.g., Anney, supra note 10.
12. See, e.g., Americans for Fair Taxation, supra note 10; Armey, supra note 10.
13. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMM'N ON ECON. GROWTH AND TAX REFORM, UNLEASHING
AMERICA'S ECONOMIC POTENTIAL: A PRO-GROWTH, PRO-FAMILY TAX SYSTEM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 5-6 (1996).
14. GRAETZ, supra note 2.
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proposal itself deserves serious consideration, one should not judge The
Decline solely on whether one agrees with the ultimate tax proposal. Graetz's
diagnosis of the income tax, his analysis of the history and politics of taxation,
and his humorous (and insightful) anecdotes are well worth the price of
admission.
The structure of the book is straightforward. The introductory chapter lays
out the problem succinctly: Twenty-five years ago. the income tax was
considered the most fair federal tax, but by the end of the 1970s, it was
considered the least fair and has remained relatively unpopular.' 5 Graetz asks:
What happened to cause this dramatic shift? Why? What, if anything, should
be done in response?
The following five chapters-or "The Decline"-attempt to address the
causes of the shift. Specifically, Graetz argues that, aside from a general fall
from grace of public institutions, public support for the income tax declined
due to five factors: the tax penalty for marriage, tax shelters, inflationary
problems, unnecessary complexities of the income tax, and increased
evasion. 16
The next six chapters-aptly entitled "The Sausage Factory"-speak to
the history and politics of tax policy, and hence address why, according to
Graetz, the income tax shifted as it did.17 This part of the book especially is a
wide-ranging and lively discussion that covers everything from the Reagan
administration's Rosie Scenarios to the politics of energy taxes, from the role
of tax experts to the never-ending debate over capital gains taxes (the last
cogently summarized as "The Madness of Two Georges"). The main message
"illustrates the trap of confusing sensible tax policy proposals with legislation
that can actually be enacted." 18 In sum, the second section of the book adds
useful political, historical, and institutional detail to the economic analysis of
the first section, reminding the reader that taxation is often constrained by
politics.
The final four chapters---"The Fall?"--address policy options. 19 In this
section, Graetz critiques the strengths and weaknesses of consumption taxes,
15. See id. at 3-4. Note that Graetz's conclusion about the income tax's decline in popularity may
rest upon weak empirical data. He appears to rest his finding upon surveys utilizing a common question
asked over a long period of time, but in general survey results on tax policy are easily manipulated and
are of dubious value. For example, a question asking whether the respondent favors a tax system where
everyone is treated alike would likely get strong support, whereas a question asking if the respondent
thinks that tax rates should be raised substantially for working poor households and dramatically cut for
millionaires would likely receive a negative response. Yet both questions could be construed as
describing or representing the flat tax.
16. See id. at 29-107.
17. Seeid. at 111-92.
18. Id. at 158.
19. See id. at 195-292.
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makes proposals for modifying the income tax, and describes his
comprehensive reform. Graetz goes beyond simple tax reform, however; he
closes with an intriguing discussion of the importance of amending the
political process itself, at least with regard to tax policy. The book closes with
a telling story about holiday hams provided to politicians by funeral homes,
ending with the modest and certain-to-be-well-received suggestion that, if
members of Congress cannot fix the political problems that lead to distorted
tax and other policies, they should resign! Although the final chapters-on the
political process-provide no ready answers, Graetz deftly brings the reader
back to the political environment that informs tax reform.
The book is not simply a "pocket guide" that provides the minimum
necessary information for one confidently to formulate opinions about tax
policy. It is, rather, a rich trove of stories and history woven around serious,
but non-technical, analysis of taxation. As such, it makes for entertaining,
informative, and engaging reading for lay persons, who will find, by the
book's end, that they have learned some economics and a little law. Tax
professionals, on the other hand, will learn new case studies in tax foolishness
and may also benefit from the book's comprehensive application of tax
principles that takes the real world seriously. Graetz's anecdotes and stories
are not simply entertaining; they help put a human face on otherwise abstract
tax concepts. Academically debating the virtues or drawbacks of tax shelters
in principle is fine, but it lacks the clarity and potency of being reminded how
some shelters actually worked. It is hard to defend, for example, the so-called
rent-a-navy episodes of the early 1980s as good tax policy where, for tax
reasons, the Department of Defense sold its ships to private companies and
leased them back for national use.
Overall, The Decline is largely successful in its discussions of the
underlying difficulties with income tax, of the role of tax politics, and of
problems with the comprehensive tax reform proposals. The analysis, it seems
to me, is level-headed, insightful, and makes many fundamental points that are
(or ought to be) central to the current tax reform debate. Along the way,
Graetz makes numerous proposals for modifying the income tax, most of
which are sensible as well. The proposal for comprehensive tax reform-that
is, the VAT coupled with a high-end, flat income tax and halved corporate
taxes---deserves a hard, long look. However, as discussed below, it may well
crash on the very reefs that have claimed other such proposals.
This Review will largely parallel the organization of Graetz's book. In
Section 1, "The Decline," I describe and critique Graetz's reasoning for the
decline of the income tax and the motivations for tax reform in general.
Section II, "The Sausage Factory," examines the part of Graetz's book by the
same name that analyzes recent fiscal and political history. In Section III,
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"The Fall?", I discuss Graetz's analysis of income tax modifications,
wholesale replacement of the current system with a consumption tax, and his
own proposal for reform.
I. The Decline
There is broad agreement, in principle at least, on the characteristics of a
good tax: It should raise sufficient revenue to finance government and it
should be simple, fair, and economically efficient. In practice, there is
probably less agreement on what some of these principles mean; fairness, for
example, is generally in the "eyes of the beholder." In addition, extreme
disagreement exists about the relative value of each of these characteristics
and about how they should be traded off against one another.
20
Graetz argues that the dominant criterion of a good tax is fairness (that is,
that the tax reflects one's ability to pay), 21 and that the income tax was first
implemented earlier this century precisely to create a fairer tax system.
22
While the income tax has been subjected to continuing debate on how high
rates should be and on what type of deductions should be allowed, a
progressive income tax has long been the centerpiece of the federal tax system
on both redistributive and revenue grounds.23
A. Graetz's Reasons for the Decline of the Income Tax
Graetz attributes the decline of the income tax to five factors and further
calls for fundamental tax reform in these areas.
1. The Marriage Tax
Graetz's first culprit is the tax penalty on marriage, whereby a married
couple pays more in taxes than they would have paid had they remained
single. The basic problem is that if the tax system applies rising marginal tax
rates to income and imposes the requirement that families with equal income
pay equal taxes, the system cannot avoid imposing marriage penalties or
marriage subsidies (or both). With the exception of revenue costs, a marriage
subsidy does not sound like a bad idea until one realizes that such a subsidy
translates into a tax penalty for those who are single.
In his book, Graetz traces the history of taxation on married and single
persons in the United States. 24 He cites one recent study that estimates two-
20. See id. at 10-13.
21. See id. at 11.
22. See id. at 15-16.
23. See id. at 20-21.
24. See, e.g., id. at 29-40.
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thirds of all married couples pay a marriage penalty. 25 A more recent study,
published after Graetz's book, indicates that 42% of married households pay
penalties while 51% receive bonuses.2 6 Annual marriage penalties total about
$29 billion while marriage bonuses total about $33 billion."
Graetz concludes that "when a tax system departs dramatically from the
fundamental values of the people it taxes, it cannot sustain public support."
28
Graetz further argues that "if Congress refuses to embrace other remedies to
eliminate it [the marriage penalty], perhaps the marriage penalty alone
justifies a flat-rate, or at least flatter-rate, income tax." 29
This last statement of Graetz's is too strong for three reasons. First,
Graetz presents no other remedies. A recent proposal would allow married
couples to choose whether to file singly or jointly. This option would
eliminate marriage penalties, but would cost $29 billion per year.31 An
alternative would require all people to file as individuals. To a first
approximation, everyone filing as individuals would eliminate both marriage
penalties and bonuses, and would generate revenue of $4 billion.32
Second, although Graetz's attention to the marriage penalty has proven
prescient, in that the penalty has received substantial attention since the fall of
1997,33 it is worth noting that the marriage tax had not been a major issue in
recent tax debates prior to 1997. For example, the marriage tax is not listed in
the index of Hall and Rabushka's book on the flat tax, which spares little
effort in disparaging the income tax.
34
Third, to eliminate the marriage penalty Graetz proposes to flatten rates,
which could significantly affect the distribution of tax burdens across income
classes. If fairness is the dominant criterion of a good tax, the relative tax
burdens on the very wealthy and the very poor may be at least as important as
a marriage penalty. It may make more sense then to abandon the notion that
families with equal incomes should pay equal taxes. That notion is already
damaged almost beyond recognition in the existing code, where tax payments
25. See id. at 29.
26. UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE
AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1997).
27. See id. at xiv.
28. GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 39.
29. Id. at 40.
30. See UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 26, at xiv.
31. See id.
32. See id. There could still be marriage bonuses because couples might have discretion over
how they allocated their capital income.
33. See David E. Rosenbaum, Marriage-Tax Amendment Moves Anti-Smoking Bill Along in
Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1998, at Al (Republican party leaders in Congress "have made elimination
of the marriage penalty their No. I tax priority this year").
34. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 8.
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depend not just on the level of income but also on the sources and uses of
income.
2. Tax Shelters
The second problem with the income tax are tax shelters. Graetz's chapter
on tax shelters is one of the most entertaining in the book as he highlights the
zeal with which tax shelters have been pursued and the lengths to which some
people will go to find and exploit shelters.35 Tax shelters involve using certain
features of the tax system to generate paper losses, offsetting other income,
and thus reducing the household's or firm's overall tax level. In other words,
tax shelters create income that is taxed at negative rates. To operate a
successful shelter requires only a few basic principles: taxes on income should
be deferred as long as possible, the rates should be as low as possible when
taxes are due, investment should be financed with debt-the interest payments
of which are tax deductible-and the debt should be deducted as soon as
possible and at as high a rate as possible.
The shelter craze of the 1970s was fueled by both inflation and the overall
level of tax rates. 36 High inflation raises both the interest rate on debt
payments and the nominal return on investment. However, since all interest
payments are tax-deductible while only part of the nominal return is taxed,
higher inflation results in a net gain for most tax sheltering schemes. High
overall tax rates increase the value of deferring taxes and the value of being
taxed at a preferred rate.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198 137 further fueled shelters by
providing generous cuts in capital income tax and write-offs for particular
38 39types of investments. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86), on the other
hand, put an end to many shelters by directly prohibiting some practices and
by allowing certain types of losses to be taken only against certain income.
40
In addition, TRA 86 capped the overall level of sheltering activity that could
occur by strengthening the alternative minimum tax (AMT).
35. See GRAET, supra note 2, at 41-51.
36. See id. at 54.
37. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
38. See, e.g., Michael C. Duest, Inflation and the Tax Code: Guidelines for Policymaking, 73
MINN. L. REV. 1217, 1247-48 (1989); Theodore S. Sims, Debt, Accelerated Depreciation, and the Tale
of a Teakettle: Tax Shelter Abuse Reconsidered, 42 UCLA L. REV. 263, 282-83 (1994).
39. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
40. See Sims, supra note 38, at 283; see also David Green, The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of
1986 on Personal Investments, 4 AKRON TAX J. 83, 83-84 (1987). See generally Lawrence Zelenak,
When Good Preferences Go Bad: A Critical Analysis of the Anti-Tax-Shelter Provisions of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986,67 TEX. L. REv. 499 (1989).
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Shelters cause numerous economic and political problems. Graetz nicely
summarizes the resulting misallocation of capital, noting that "[c]apital was
running around the country like the Keystone Kops, looking for the most tax-
favored investments' '4 and concluding that "[i]t doesn't take a rocket scientist
to know that a country that has designed and maintained a tax system that has
inspired its nation's savings to chase after chinchilla coats, bad movies,
rosebushes, and overvalued Bibles is seriously handicapping itself....
Graetz points to two additional effects of the sheltering phenomenon that
are less often discussed than others, but perhaps of equal importance. First,
fraud accompanied many of the sheltering schemes. In principle, sheltering is
distinct from fraud, but it may also be the case that sheltering encourages
fraudulent behavior. Graetz provides several examples-that ostensibly show
the follies of shelters-where the problem was not the presence of a shelter
but rather that the shelter was fraudulent. 43 Second, Graetz argues that the
sheltering boom caused a subtle but major shift in the philosophy of tax
advisers-attorneys and accountants-from the view that a tax return should
be the taxpayer's best determination of the actual tax due, to the view that
every issue should be resolved in favor of paying fewer taxes, on the
assumption that the taxpayer will most likely not be audited or, if audited, the
IRS agent will either overlook or compromise on the issue. I am not in a
position to judge Graetz's claim, as I am not an attorney or accountant, and
did not have any taxable income prior to 1986. But, if Graetz is right, the tax-
shelter boom that was curtailed in 1986 may have had an important, lasting
consequence on the government's ability to raise revenues and tax capital
income.
Graetz did not, however, give sufficient emphasis to some issues raised
by shelters. Besides being unfair-why should investments in rosebushes, for
example, receive subsidies when other investments do not?-shelters reduce
revenue, which in turn necessitates higher tax rates to keep overall revenues
constant. This result, of course, breeds demands for additional loopholes since
escape from high tax rates is a cause of shelters in the first place. In addition,
the presence of shelters and the attendant higher tax rates on the unsheltered
income might make it more difficult for Congress to resist providing
additional shelters. Additionally, the sheer administrative costs of shelters are
a further deadweight loss. Sheltering schemes were (and are) often quite
complex, even if they arise from the few basic principles outlined above.45 For
41. GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 42.
42. Id. at 49.
43. See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 45-46 (describing potentially fraudulent chinchilla farms
and other schemes).
44. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 51.
45. See. e.g., id. at 46-48.
Vol. 15:387, 1998
Tax Reform in the Real World
example, Graetz's description of the rent-a-navy episodes conjures up an
image of armies of attorneys at work for months.
In addition, the chapter fails to focus to any great extent on the elaborate
"financial engineering" schemes that have developed in recent years along
with their developments in financial markets.46
Finally, Graetz does not emphasize enough that some of our most
cherished tax regimes-the mortgage interest deduction, 401(k) plans, IRAs,
etc.-are essentially tax shelters, or at least can easily be converted into tax
shelters. For example, while arguments can be made in favor of interest
deductions and 401(k)s separately, it is hard to think of arguing for allowing
people to finance their 401(k) contributions with increased mortgage debt or
home equity loans. There is, however, some evidence that 401(k)
contributions have been financed largely, if perhaps unintentionally, by
increases in mortgage debt.47 The problem for tax policy is that trying to
prohibit such a practice without prohibiting either the interest deduction or the
401(k) is futile. This problem indicates the difficulty of distinguishing
between "shelters" and "incentives," and suggests that tax shelters will always
exist in an income tax.
3. Inflationary Problems
The third problem addressed in The Decline is the interaction between
income tax and inflation. Inflation creates several problems in the income tax
and exacerbates others. Increases in prices tend to raise people's nominal
income, but not their real income. Before the 1980s, higher nominal income
would raise one's inflation-adjusted (real) tax payments, both by raising the
level of taxable income and sometimes by increasing the marginal rate of
taxation-the latter known as "bracket creep., 48 The lack of indexing was thus
a tremendous money machine for the government. For example, between 1965
and 1980, the price level rose by 162%. 49 This generated automatic increases
46. For general discussions of the taxation of financial instruments and the distortions created by
public policy deficiencies in this area, see Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial
Innovation's Newest Challenge to the Tax System, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1319 (1991); Reed Shuldiner, A
General Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 71 TEX. L. REV. 243 (1992); David A.
Weisbach, Tax Responses to Financial Contract Innovation, 50 TAX L. REv. 491 (1995).
47. See, e.g., Eric M. Engen & William G. Gale, Death, Taxes, and the Effects of 401(k)s on
Household Wealth Accumulation (1997) (unpublished mimeograph, on file with the Brookings
Institution). There is similar but weaker evidence that a similar phenomenon financed a significant
portion of IRA contributions as well. See id. However, one would naturally expect that debt-financing is
relatively more attractive for 401(k)s than for IRAs, since the former often contain an employer
matching contribution.
48. GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 53-54.
49. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 349 tbl.B-60
(1998) (consumer price indexes for major expenditure classes).
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in revenues that could be used to "cut" taxes or to finance additional shelters.
Thus, in addition to raising the demand for tax shelters as described above, the
interaction between inflation and the income tax created the mechanism by
which shelters could be financed.50
The 1981 Tax Act (effective in 1985) indexed personal and dependent
exemptions, standard deductions, and tax brackets for inflation.5 1 The
importance of this change is much under-appreciated. Even the moderate
annual inflation rates that occurred between 1985 and 1996 -had the
cumulative effect of raising the price level by about 45%.52 In the absence of
indexing, this would have led to automatic substantial revenue increases. In
the presence of indexing, however, income tax revenues were relatively flat as
a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP).53
Despite these changes, the income tax is not fully indexed for inflation
and much work would be required to make the income tax inflation-proof.
5 4
The treatment of assets and debt pose particular problems. As is now well-
known, capital gains are taxed on a nominal basis. 5 5 This means that sales of
assets that represent nominal gains but real losses still face a positive tax
burden. Note that taxing capital gains at a preferred rate, as in the current
income tax, does nothing to solve this problem. An oft-repeated proposal of
indexing capital gains for inflation would solve this problem. 56 This change
may, however, prove complicated, as Graetz argues.5 7 Moreover, it would
exacerbate other problems in the taxation of asset income. Capital gains are
already taxed at lower effective rates than other assets because of the preferred
tax rate, the ability to defer gains taxes by not selling the asset, and the ability
to avoid all capital gains taxes if the asset is held until death. Indexing capital
gains would thus increase the disparity between the taxation of capital gains
and other forms of asset income. It would also create problems with debt
financing. Since all interest payments are deductible, indexing only the capital
gains would increase the ability to shelter income with debt-financed
purchases of assets that generate capital gains.
A complete solution would index all forms of capital income and interest
payments for inflation. This implies, however, that all interest deductions
under the current income tax would be reduced, and as Graetz notes, "[n]o
politician has any will to advance indexing for debt . ,58 In any case, the
50. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 55.
51. See id. at 56.
52. See COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, supra note 49, at 349 tbl.B-60.
53. See id.
54. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 59.
55. See, e.g., id.
56. See, e.g., id.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 64.
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indexing of all capital gains is probably too complicated to be enacted,
especially if one of the goals of tax reform is to reduce complexity.
In short, none of the three solutions-not indexing asset income or
payments, indexing only capital gains, nor indexing all asset income and
payments-is fully satisfactory. Thus, inflation will always cause problems
under an income tax. One of the advantages of well-designed consumption
taxes is that they are inflation proof.
59
Graetz does not highlight the AMT as a source of inflationary problems,
but it may soon become one. The AMT is a notoriously complex tax that
applies to anyone who generates what the law considers to be "too many"
deductions relative to their level of income.60 In the AMT, income is taxed on
a relatively broader base and relatively flatter rate than under the conventional
income tax. The inflation problem is that the personal exemption under the
AMT is not indexed for inflation. For this and other reasons, recent estimates
suggest that in 2007, 9 million households will face the AMT, compared to
only about 700,000 in 1997.61 Fixing this problem, at the very least by




The fourth problem is the complexity of the income tax. Graetz describes
a so-called typical family, headed by Joe and Jane Six-Pack, who start out
sounding like Ward and June Cleaver but end up stuck in a tax version of
Friday the 13th, part 1040. Jane is a self-employed physical therapist, while
Joe drives a company-provided truck. They live with their children, one of
their mothers, and a local college student who pays reduced rent in exchange
for provision of household services. As a seemingly unimportant
foreshadowing detail, they also have a maid!
Like a good director, Graetz slowly takes his reader through the tax
horrors facing this innocent family: miscellaneous itemized deductions, the
child care credit, deductions for work clothing and the home office,
deductions for work travel (for Jane) and the company truck (for Joe), the
appropriate imputation of rental income, payroll taxes for the maid, and how
the presence of renters affects the mortgage interest deduction. 63 The most
59. An example of a poorly designed consumption tax would be the flat tax with a mortgage
interest deduction. Under that system, interest income is not taxed, but interest payments would be
deductible, creating large opportunities to game the system.
60. See, e.g., Robert P. Harvey & Jerry Tempalski, The Individual AMT: Why It Matters, 12
NAT'L TAX J. 453, 455-63 (1997).
61. See,e.g.,id.at453,463-71.
62. See id. at 471.
63. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 68-80.
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incredible morasses involve the dependency requirements (how to determine
whether the mother is a dependent),64 the child care credit (the taxpayer must
ensure that the child care provider is in compliance with "all applicable
federal rules"), 65 interest deductions66 (Graetz claims the law currently
distinguishes seventeen types of interest payments for tax purposes 67), and
whether the Six-Packs need to make payroll tax payments for their maid68
(you don't want to know). On top of all that, the Six-Packs may also face
important differences between federal and state/local taxes.69 But, the reader
learns that the couple should be grateful, as they have no complicated capital
income transactions, do not face the AMT, nor are eligible for the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC).
It would be interesting to know whether the Six-Packs favored the 1997
Tax Act. If they did, they deserve the added nightmares they now face: up to
fifteen different tax rates on capital gains, 70 child credits, 71 education credits,72
and a bewildering maze of tax-favored savings accounts. 73 Although sequels
are usually not very good, an update of the Six-Packs to include the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997 (TRA 97) would be a horror film worth watching.
The tax system is undoubtedly an outrageous nightmare of complexity for
the Six-Packs. Graetz is convincing that even ordinary tax circumstances can
quickly turn ugly and complicated. He goes further, however, and argues that
extraordinary complexity is a hallmark of the income tax. This is partially due
to compromise in legislation among the various principles or goals of tax
policy, and partially to the fact that taxation of business or capital income is
inherently difficult. His solution is for Congress to be more arbitrary-that is,
to make fewer fine distinctions of tax law and settle for rough justice in trying
to measure income.
74
Graetz is clearly onto something here, as complexity is no doubt a sore
point with taxpayers. He appears, however, to overstate his case in three ways.
First, while many people could end up like the Six-Packs, it is not clear how
many actually do. About forty-four million tax filers submit a simplified
64. See id. at 77.
65. See id. at 70-71.
66. See id. at 75-77.
67. See id. at 76.
68. See id. at 78-80.
69. See id. at 261-62.
70. See, e.g., Leonard E. Burman, Big, Big Postcard, TAX NOTES 111-12 (1997).
71. See, e.g., Robert D. Reischauer, Light at the End of the Tunnel or Another Illusion?: The
1997 Budget Deal, 51 NAT'L TAX J. 143, 143-68 (1998).
72. See, e.g., id.
73. See, e.g., id.
74. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 85.
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1040A or 1040EZ form.75 Blumenthal and Slemrod present evidence from a
survey of taxpayers that suggests that 30% of households spent between zero
and five hours preparing their tax return and keeping records for tax purposes,
76
and an additional 15% spent less than ten hours. Almost half made no
financial expenditure on tax preparation, and an additional 17% paid less than
$50. 77
Second, as Graetz notes later in The Decline, many of these complexities
have less to do with the income tax relative to, say, the flat tax, than with
permitting deductions for given activities. For example, the child care credit
could just as easily be enacted in a flat tax. The flat tax achieves simplicity
with regard to the child care credit simply by eliminating it. This could occur
under the income tax too. If a credit is allowed under either tax, however, a
variety of decisions regarding what is and is not included have to be made.
Third, Graetz notes that it cost Mobil $10 million in 1993 to prepare its
tax return, which comprised a year's work for fifty-seven people 78 What is
one to make of this figure? For one thing, Mobil itself provided the figure.
79
For another, in 1993, Mobil operated in more than 100 countries and had
world wide revenue of $65 billion.80 Mobil's revenues exceeded the GDP of
137 countries and twenty-two of the states in the United States,8 1 and Mobil
paid U.S. income taxes of $19 million. 2 Thus, Mobil's total U.S. income tax
burden, including compliance costs, was $29 million (if one believes the $10
million figure), or roughly 0.04% of worldwide revenues. Its total worldwide
83tax burden was $1,931 billion, so only 1% of its tax payments were due to
the federal income tax.
In contrast to Mobil, a recent study of the Hewlett-Packard corporation
concluded that "[a] large U.S. multinational company can complete an
accurate corporate tax return with the functional equivalent of three full-time
tax professionals. 8 4 It would be interesting to know why Mobil's return was
so much more costly than HP's. To the extent that the problem lies in the tax
system, it would be useful to know which features caused the problems.
75. See Individual Tax Statistics Background Information (visited June 5, 1998)
<http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/plain/taxstats/soi/indback.html>.
76. See Marsha Blumenthal & Joel Slemrod, The Compliance Cost of the US. Individual Income
Tax System: A Second Look After Tax Reform, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 185, 189 (1992).
77. See id. at 189-200
78. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 85.
79. See id.
80. See MOBIL CORP., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 1, 27 (1993).
81. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (1997) (CD-Rom).
82. See MOBIL CORP., supra note 80, at 40.
83. See id.
84. David R. Seltzer, Federal Income Tax Compliance Costs: A Case Study of Hewlett-Packard
Company, 50 NAT'L TAX J. 487-93 (1997).
Yale Journal on Regulation
5. Evasion
The fifth income tax problem that Graetz identifies is evasion. Well over
$100 billion per year in tax payments on legitimate income is owed but not
paid to the IRS.8 5 The underground economy probably accounts for a
significant additional amount.
86
Graetz makes several important points in this chapter. First, the current
system has essentially two different enforcement tiers. For households that
receive all of their income from wages, the IRS is able to match virtually all
returns to wages reported by the employer. 87 Thus, effectively, all of these
households are audited. Not surprisingly, the estimated evasion rate for these
forms of income is quite low.88 In contrast, households with a significant
portion of their income from capital gains or from sole proprietorships or
farms face much greater opportunities to evade taxes; not surprisingly, the
estimated evasion rate for these forms of income is quite high.89
Second, over the past two decades, the IRS has essentially conducted an
experiment in trying to raise compliance. The experiment consists of three
parts: reduced audits (6% of returns were audited in 1965, compared to only
2 % in 1976, and less than 1% in the early 1990s), more third-party reporting
of information, and larger penalties for those who are caught cheating.
90
Graetz applauds the increase in information reporting but argues that reducing
the audit rate was a major mistake "from which the IRS probably will never
recover."91
Economic theory indicates that lower tax rates raise compliance by
reducing the incentive to evade taxes. Graetz notes, however, that the
reduction in capital gains tax rates in the mid-1980s resulted in lower, not
higher, compliance rates on income from capital gains.92 He concludes that
"[t]he Pollyannaish notion that compliance problems will disappear if we
lower tax rates or shift from an income to a consumption tax does not
withstand even cursory analysis." 93
Although this chapter by Graetz is generally quite good, it nonetheless
contains some red herrings, or at least some unfair criticisms, of the income
tax. For example, the chapter highlights a waitress confessing that she under-
85. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 105.
86. See id. at 105.
87. See id. at 93.
88. See id. at 93.
89. See id. at 94-95.
90. See, e.g., id. at 96-98.
91. Id. at 93.
92. See id. at 94.
93. Id. at 105.
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reports her tip income. Does anyone believe that would change under a flat
tax?
In addition, Graetz repeats a common mistake in the analysis of
consumption taxes and tax evasion. He argues that an advantage of a
consumption tax is a reduction in evasion: "A drug dealer who [currently]
evades income taxes will pay sales taxes when he spends his illegal
earnings. 94 While it is true that the dealer would pay taxes under a sales tax,
it is also true that he would not end up worse off than under the income tax.
Under the income tax, his income is not taxed but the income of people who
buy drugs is taxed. Under the sales tax, the dealer's consumption is taxed, but
the drug consumption of people who buy drugs is not taxed. Either way, one
party to the transaction becomes free of the tax.
95
In summary, The Decline succeeds in identifying five significant
problems. It would, of course, be desirable to fix or reduce the problems
arising from marriage penalties, inflation, shelters, complexity, and non-
compliance. However, doing so is neither simple nor easy, as solving any one
of these problems often worsens the others.
B. What's Really Driving Tax Reform?
A basic problem with Graetz's analysis is that he overstates the degree to
which the problems he identifies in The Decline have driven recent proposals
for fundamental tax reform. For example, he notes that "[t]oday's proposals
for radical change in the income tax-such as the flat tax, which, as I shall
subsequently demonstrate, have serious problems of their own-are in large





Before explaining why I disagree with this interpretation of today's
fundamental tax reform movement, let me first note that I would be delighted
94. Id.
95. An example can show why. Suppose that, currently, the dealer sells $100 worth of drugs
(assume for simplicity that there is zero cost of producing the drug). The dealer should pay $20, say, in
income taxes but does not, so he is able to consume $100 worth of goods, rather than $80. Now suppose
we remove the 20% income tax and replace it with a sales tax of 25% and assume for simplicity that it
shows up as an increase in the price of goods. (Because sales taxes are measured on a base that excludes
the tax, while income taxes are measured on a base that includes the tax, a 20% income tax is equivalent
to a 25% sales tax in an economy where consumption equals income (i.e., there is no saving). In the
current example, 25% of $80 (the consumption tax base) is equal to 20% of $100 (the income tax base).)
The key point is that now the dealer can sell the same quantity of drugs for $125 rather than $100, since
all prices have increased by 25%. If he then spends the proceeds on consumption, and pays the sales tax,
he can still consume $100 worth of goods after-tax under the sales tax. Thus, he is no worse off under
the sales tax than under the income tax. The sales tax raised his tax payment on consumption, but it
raised his income by the same amount.
96. GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 8.
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to believe that Graetz's interpretation of these trends is correct-that rational
and thoughtful analysis of several problems has led households to rethink their
support for the income tax. The infusion of so much economics and logic into
the information set and apparent preference determination of the typical
American household would be a dream come true for economists and policy
wonks. And there are sound economic reasons why disciplined, conceptually
consistent tax reform could improve overall economic performance and
reduce tax complexity. Nevertheless, for several reasons, I doubt that Graetz's
interpretation is correct.
First, the issues he raises are problems of long standing; it is unclear why
they should have come to a head in the mid-I 990s. Perhaps the problems have
accumulated critical mass over time, but the income tax has plausibly
improved since the late 1970s. At that time, the highest rates were 70%,
annual inflation was around 10%,98 taxes were not indexed for inflation,99 and
shelters were booming. 00 Since then, the highest tax rate has dropped to
39.6%;" °" inflation has slowed to 3% or less; 10 2 tax brackets, 10 3 standard
deductions, 104 and personal exemptions'05 have been indexed for inflation; and
a significant portion of tax shelters have been eliminated. 106 The effects of the
marriage tax have been mixed: More families face the marriage tax today than
in the 1970s, largely because of changes in family structure, but the average
penalty among those households has fallen by about a third from its peak in
the late 1970s.10 7 In any case, as noted above, the marriage tax attracted so
little attention before 1997 that the tax act that year actually exacerbated the
penalty in some cases (e.g., with the child credit).108 Nor, as far as I can tell, is
the income tax accused of strangling the economy so often these days as the
economy moves through its seventh year of expansion and has suffered only
one relatively mild recession in the last fifteen years,1°9 while the stock market
has increased manyfold. 10 As Graetz notes repeatedly, even advocates of
97. See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 313 tbl.A-1 (5th ed. 1987).
98. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 49, at 349 tbl.B-60.
99. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 52-54.
100. See id. at 41-51.
101. See Aaron & Gale, supra note 1, at 246.
102. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 49, at 349 tbl.B-60.
103. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 56-57.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 48.
107. See, e.g., James Aim & Leslie A. Whittington, Income Taxes and the Timing of Marital
Decisions, 64 J. PUB. ECON. 219, 231 tbl.2 (1997).
108. See, e.g., Amity Shlaes, Marriage Keeps Getting More Taxing, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1997,
at A22.
109. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 49, at 280-81 tbl.B-1 (gross domestic
product).
110. See id. at 390 tbl.B-95 (common stock prices and yields).
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fundamental reform try to call their reforms some type of "income tax" rather
than a "consumption tax."' 11 He argues that this results from lingering public
beliefs that income taxes in principle are fair. In short, the problems Graetz
identifies are long-standing, and it is not clear why those problems should
make people want to abandon income taxation rather than modify it.
My second concern with Graetz's interpretation is that current reform
proposals do not solve some of the five problems he lists, and more
importantly would have their largest effects on aspects of taxation that Graetz
does not discuss as problems. For example, Representative Richard Armey's
flat tax proposal contains an annual marriage penalty of $3,300 times the tax
rate for every couple with children where the husband and wife each earn at
least $14,000 annually." 2 Similarly, the national retail sales tax contains
substantial marriage penalties." 3 Moreover, it is difficult to see how the sales
tax would engender higher compliance than the income tax does since such
plans would reduce income reporting and withholding, with some variants of
the proposal envisioning the abolition of the IRS.
In addition, fundamental tax reform-or at least the sales tax and the flat
tax-seems to address three issues other than the problems Graetz emphasizes
in The Decline. First, the reform proposals would provide large tax cuts for
the wealthiest households. Gale, Houser, and Scholz estimate that families in
the top 1% of income distribution would see their total (i.e., federal and state)
tax liabilities fall by about $38,000 if the flat tax replaced the individual and
corporate income tax. 114 Gentry and Hubbard estimate that households in the
top 1% would see tax payments 24% lower under a broad-based consumption
tax than under the current income tax." 5 Feenberg, Mitrusi, and Poterba
estimate that replacing the individual income tax, corporate income tax, and
111. See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 216.
112. See The Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1997, H.R. 1040, 105th Cong.
(introduced by Representative Richard Armey); see also The Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of
1997, S. 1040, 105th Cong. (introduced by Senator Richard Shelby). The exemption levels in the
Armey/Shelby flat tax are $14,000 for a single head of household, $10,700 for singles, and $21,400 for
married couples. Therefore, two people with children could obtain $24,700 if they are not married, but
only $21,400 if they are married. Thus, if both earn in excess of $14,000, their combined tax base will
be $3,300 larger if they remain married. At a tax rate of 20%, their annual tax burden would be $660
higher as a married couple than if they were single.
113. See, e.g., William G. Gale, An Evaluation of the National Retail Sales Tax 46-47 (1997)
(Brookings Institution mimeograph) (on file with author).
114. See William G. Gale et al., Distributional Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform, in
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 281, 290 (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale eds.,
1996).
115. See William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, Distributional Implications of Introducing a
Broad-Based Consumption Tax, 11 TAX POL'Y & ECON. 1, 35 (1997).
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estate tax with a national retail sales tax would reduce the tax burden on
households in the top 1% of income distribution by over $65,000 annually. 116
Second, the reforms are likely to involve an overall tax cut. Any large-
scale tax restructuring that is revenue-neutral will inevitably result in a large
number of winners and losers. Simultaneous tax cuts would reduce the
number of losers and raise the number of winners, and thereby help grease the
political wheels of tax reform. 117
Third, most fundamental tax reforms would reduce or eliminate the
government's ability to administer social policy through the tax code.
Currently, the income tax contains subsidies for homeownership, charitable
giving, health insurance, low-income workers, pensions, state and local
government programs, and other sectors and activities." 8 Fundamental tax
reform would hinder use of the tax code to achieve these policy objectives."19
Graetz, however, does not identify any of these factors as problems with
the income tax. There does not appear to be simmering resentment among the
populace, for example, over excessive taxes that they foisted onto the wealthy.
Nor do complaints about the overall level of taxes have much basis; the
overall ratio of federal taxes as a proportion of GDP has remained fairly
constant over the last thirty years. 120 To the extent that it has risen, the
increase is due to specific actions financing social security and Medicare and
balancing the budget. 121 Nor does Graetz claim that there is strong public
support for abolishing social policies toward housing, health, charity,
retirement provision, or other goals. Support for these subsides appears firmly
entrenched; they provide major benefits for targeted sectors, acting as
replacements for government spending programs. In one sense, these
subsidies are like the tax shelters of the 1970s and 1980s-they provide
incentives to redirect households' and businesses' activities. Yet in another
sense they are quite different; while the public may not support subsidies for
chinchilla coats, support for housing, health care, charity, and retirement
subsidies is probably much stronger.
116. See Daniel R. Feenberg et al., Distributional Effects of Adopting a National Retail Sales
Tax, 11 TAX POL'Y & ECON. 75-82 (1997). This allows demogrants, which would provide payments of
the poverty line times the tax rate to each family. If demogrants were eliminated, the annual reduction in
taxes for the top income group would be about $100,000. See id.
117. Representative Armey is in fact very candid about this aspect of tax reform. See Armey,
supra note 10.
118. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 1999.
119. The pro-simplicity, pro-growth purposes of fundamental reform would be frustrated by the
introduction of complicating social purposes. See infra notes 181-185 and accompanying text.
120. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 49, at 374 tbl.B-79 (govemment revenues);
id. at 375 tbl.B-80 (outlays by function).
121. See id. at 374 tbl.B-79; id. at 375 tbl.B-80.
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Thus, Graetz is correct not to identify the level of taxation of the wealthy,
the overall level of taxation, and the use of social policies in the tax code as
major sources of public complaint about the income tax. Yet these are three of
the largest changes in taxation that the sales or flat tax would bring about.'
22
Thus, the tax reform movement appears to be addressing different issues than
the legitimate problems that Graetz points out, and perhaps even different
issues than the public cares about.
Tax activities in 1997 are the third reason to doubt that Graetz's five
concerns are driving current movements in tax policy. TRA 97 introduced
child and education credits; increased the tax preference for capital gains;
created new saving incentives for retirement, education, and other purposes;
provided estate tax relief for farmers, small businesses and others; and enacted
many other changes.'23 The fall of 1997 witnessed hearings on IRS abuses and
saw proposals that might reduce the agency's enforcement and audit
powers. 124
What sort of preferences led to these policies? Certainly not a desire to
reduce complexity: TRA 97 makes the code more complicated in numerous
ways, including the treatment of capital gains,125 rules regarding education
and saving accounts, 126 and child credits. 27 While Congress may truly oppose
tax complexity, that opposition appears to be conditional: Complexity that
reduces taxes is tolerated much more than complexity that raises taxes. Nor
did there appear to be a congressional desire to raise compliance. Reducing
the authority and ability of the IRS to gather information will likely reduce
voluntary compliance by giving taxpayers more courage to abuse or, at least,
favorably interpret the rules. Nor was there concern about the marriage
penalty, which I do not recall having even entered the public discussion. In
fact, some of the credits in TRA 97 actually increase the marriage tax because
they are phased out as income rises.1 28 Furthermore, concern over tax shelters
would not have led to a cut in the rates on capital gains. Low capital gains
rates actually encourage the shelter industry, in that deferring income and
122. Some would argue that the major change is the switch from an income to a consumption
tax. See, e.g., Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REv. 961 (1992); Alvin
Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980). As I
argue below, however, the distinction between a pure income tax and a pure consumption tax is quite
minimal-and focuses on whether business' capital purchases are all deducted in the year of purchase or
must be depreciated over their useful lives. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 1, at 126-38. See generally
Gentry & Hubbard, supra note 115.
123. See, e.g., Reischauer, supra note 71, at 162.
124. See, e.g., Michael Hirsch, Behind the I.R.S. Curtain, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 1997, at 30.
125. See, e.g., Reischauer, supra note 71, at 162.
126. See, e.g., id.
127. See, e.g., id.
128. See, e.g., Shlaes, supra note 108, at A22.
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taxing it at preferential rates, along with tax-deductible debt finance, are the
cornerstones of the tax shelter industry. 129 The interaction between inflation
and income taxes probably had some influence on the debate, as efforts to
index capital gains gained steam but ultimately failed. 130 Thus, whatever
preferences actually drove tax policy in 1997, they appear to have been
largely orthogonal to Graetz's concerns. In Graetz's defense, TRA 97
occurred after his book was written. Nevertheless, TRA 97 can be used as an
out-of-sample test that fails to support the view that the five factors identified
in The Decline motivated the interest in tax reform.
The fourth piece of evidence against Graetz's view is simply that TRA 97
was almost the exact opposite of fundamental tax reform in most respects. It
made the tax code more complicated, introduced more tax distinctions based
on how money was earned or spent, created new shelters, and raised effective
tax rates. 131 Yet many of the same people who advocated fundamental tax
reform in 1996 (and are currently pushing for further reform) were the
architects of TRA 97.132 Although all of Graetz's five criticisms are valid,
they cannot explain the impulses for fundamental tax reform in 1996 and
1998-or support for the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Graetz's own rejection
of the flat tax, sales tax, and USA tax as alternatives to the current system
suggests that Graetz implicitly agrees that the five problems he lays out are
not the primary sources of those reform proposals.
To reiterate, my major critique of The Decline is that the five legitimate
and important concerns raised by Graetz do not appear to be actually driving
the fervor for fundamental tax reform. This critique leads to two important
questions: First, what is driving the fervor, and second, why does it matter?
One explanation consistent with the issues raised above is a public or
congressional desire to reduce the overall level of taxation, and with it the
power, size, and scope of government. Why attack taxes to cut the size of
government? Because taxes are the least popular aspect of government. That
is, although the level of government spending and the structure of the tax
systems are separate issues, advocates of smaller government may be using
hostility to taxes as a cover for shrinking government.
The motivation for tax reform matters because the implementation of
fundamental tax reform would require dealing with a host of issues whose
resolution would impact the structure of the plan. If the goal of tax reform is
to obtain a more disciplined, consistent, and simple tax system, one hopes that
the details would be carried out systematically and coherently. However, if the
129. See supra notes 36, 47, 50 and accompanying text.
130. See generally Reischauer, supra note 71.
131. See, e.g., Reischauer, supra note 71, at 162.
132. See, e.g., William G. Gale, Tax Reform, Anyone?, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Aug. 18,
1997, at 19.
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goal of reformers is to cut the size of the government, then implementation
could raise as many inconsistencies, shelters, and complexities as it resolves.
Graetz himself emphasizes throughout his book that political motivations have
always had a major hand in shaping tax policy.
For example, Representative Armey proposes a flat tax rate of 17% with
an exemption level of $31,400 for a family of four.1 33 Under 1996 law, that
would reduce tax revenues by $138 billion.1 34 However, if transition relief
were provided-as it would likely have to be-taking the minimal form of
allowing firms to grandfather depreciation deductions on previous
investments, an additional annual revenue loss of approximately $50-100
billion would result. 135 If deductions for taxes paid, mortgage interest, charity,
etc. were allowed, the deficit would increase by an additional $100 billion or
more.1 36 This is obviously not a sustainable outcome--either taxes would
have to be raised or spending reduced. But if the goal of policy makers is to
cut the current size of government, a flat tax coupled with a tax cut would
force the issue and shift the terms of the debate.
II. The Sausage Factory
The next six chapters of Graetz's book provide perspectives on tax policy
over the last thirty years. The main purpose of this section is to illustrate that
taxation is politically constrained. Chapter Seven discusses the gradual
diffusion of power in tax policy over the last three decades. Whereas the Ways
and Means committee chairman (Wilbur Mills) once appeared to be the
second-most-powerful man in the country, that power has since diffused in
several directions. Other congressional committees, additional congressional
staff, an increased role for lobbyists, and other factors have led to a complex
morass, with numerous interested parties having access to the decision-
making process. 137 Graetz's main point here is that this diffusion can stifle the
tax policy process. While his conclusion seems correct, it is also interesting to
note that the last twenty years have been a very busy period for tax reform, 138
133. See The Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1997, H.R. 1040, 105th Cong.
(introduced by Representative Richard Armey).
134. See William G. Gale, The Kemp Commission and the Future of Tax Reform, 70 TAX NOTES
717, 721-22 (1996).
135. See id. at 722-23. Transition relief would plausibly also include grandfathering of interest
deductions on existing loans and net loss carryforwards. As Graetz notes in chapter 8, one must also
consider the likelihood of one-time, back-door transition relief snuck into the code in order to generate
political support for favored groups and individuals.
136. See Gale, supra note 134, at 722-23.
137. See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 116-20.
138. See, e.g., Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. MeChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and
Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REv. 913 (1987).
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with major changes coming in 1981,139 1982, 140 1983, 141 1984, 142 1986, 143
1990, 44 1993, 145 and 1997. 146
Chapter 8 discusses tax policy in the 1980s. I do not find the views
expressed here very controversial. Graetz argues that the 1981 tax cut was a
Christmas tree of overly generous subsidies to capital. He also argues that
TRA 86, while an improvement over the existing system, did not approach a
full solution. In particular, despite substantial closing of tax shelters and
reductions in tax rates, the Act failed to simplify vast portions of the code and
left numerous deductions and exclusions intact. 147 Graetz also highlights some
of the more dubious "transition rules" that accompanied the Act.148 These
drained about $10-15 billion in revenue, and were widely regarded as payoffs
to favored constituencies (or individuals) to clear the way for political support
for TRA 86.149 In light of the potentially profound changes invoked by
fundamental tax reform, the prospect of such deals should be taken seriously.
Chapter 9 provides an interesting perspective on the raging capital gains
debate of recent years. Graetz argues that the fiercest advocates on both sides
139. See, e.g., Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198 1, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Alan L. Feld, The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981:
Fairness in Rate Cuts in the Individual Income Tax, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 429 (1983).
140. See, e.g., Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat.
324 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Michael J. Graetz, The 1982 Minimum Tax
Amendments as a First Step in the Transition to a "Flat-Rate" Tax, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1983).
141. See, e.g., Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65, 26 U.S.C. §
86 (1994); Christopher Hoyt, Income Taxation of Social Security Benefits: Balancing Social Policy with
Tax Policy, 54 UMKC L. REV. 399 (1986).
142. See, e.g., Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Edward Nichols, Behind the Tax Fencing Lurks Real
Problem, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Aug. 26, 1984, at Cl. See generally Maijorie A. O'Connell,
History of the Act, 7 FAM. ADvoc. 5 (1984).
143. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci
GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987).
144. See, e.g., Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Edward J. Castellani, An Overview of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, 70 MICH. B.J. 568 (1991).
145. See, e.g., Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Howard J. Golden, Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, in TAX LAW AND ESTATE PLANNING 1993, at 121 (PLI Tax Law and Estate
Planning Course Handbook Series No. J4-3670, 1993); Kenneth J. Kies, Estimated Budget Effects of the
Revenue Provisions of H.R.2264 (The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993) as Passed by the
Congress for Fiscal Years 1994-1998, in TAX LAW AND ESTATE PLANNING 1993, at 7 (PLI Tax Law and
Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No. J4-3670, 1993).
146. See, e.g., Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); DAVID ALTIG ET AL., SIMULATING U.S. TAX REFORM I
(National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6248, 1997); Eugene E. Peckham, An Overview
of 1997 Tax Changes, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J. 54 (1997).
147. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 134.
148. See id. at 137-39.
149. See, e.g., id. at 138-39.
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of the debate are misguided. Opponents of capital gains cuts overstate the
virtues of taxing capital gains at the full income tax rate because they ignore
the fact that people have discretion over when to realize capital gains. Thus,
taxing the gains at high rates does not mean that substantial revenue would
accrue.1 50 Proponents of capital gains tax cuts overstate the virtues of reducing
the rate because there is at best weak evidence that investment or
entrepreneurship would rise in response to the tax cut.1 51 Graetz's solution is
to set the capital gains tax rate at the rate that maximizes revenue, as any other
rate would require that revenue be made up somewhere else. He seems to
imply that the revenue-maximizing rate is between 19% and 28%. 152
This "solution," however, is troubling in a number of respects. First,
Graetz violates it himself later in the book when he proposes that capital gains
be taxed at the same rate as other income (in my view a more desirable
outcome than the one he initially proposes). Second, tax literature offers a host
of alternative criteria, none of which involve setting the marginal revenue
collected equal to zero. 53 Third, much of the debate on capital gains occurs
precisely because of disagreement about what the revenue-maximizing rate
is.' 54 One issue in this debate is the appropriate time horizon to employ. The
revenue-maximizing rate over a short time horizon is typically lower than
over a longer horizon because a tax cut now will induce people to cash in
some of the capital gains they would have cashed in the future. Both time
series and cross-sectional analyses also face difficult problems. Many of these
can be resolved by examining panel data that spans various tax reforms.
Burman and Randolph use panel data, finding that the short-term elasticity is
an order of magnitude higher than the long-term elasticity. 55 Calculations
based on these results imply that the revenue maximizing long-run rate is
actually well above 28%.
156
Chapter 10 discusses both the advantages of increased taxes on alcohol,
tobacco, energy use, and pollution and the political difficulties of passing such
taxes. So-called "sin taxes" have the advantage of providing incentives to
150. See id. at 143.
151. Seeid. at 145-46.
152. See id. at 144-45.
153. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Rudnick, Enforcing the Fundamental Premises of Partnership
Taxation, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 229, 306-07 (1993) ("social welfare loss can be measured by the welfare
loss to taxpayers who change their transactions because of the tax minus the revenue gain"); George R.
Zodrow, Economic Analyses of Capital Gains Taxation: Realizations, Revenues, Efficiency, and Equity,
48 TAX L. REV. 419, 464 (1993) (noting that tax scholars often prefer to minimize deadweight loss
instead of maximize revenue).
154. See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 144-45.
155. See Leonard E. Burman & William Randolph, Measuring Permanent Response to Capital
Gains Tax Changes in Panel Data, 84 AM. EcON. REv. 794 (1994).
156. See id.
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reduce the extent of activities widely believed to have negative social
consequences. One can, of course, go too far-it is possible to have tax rates
on these items that are excessive relative to the damage they cause. Graetz
argues, however, that we are not currently in danger of reaching those
excessive taxation levels.
Chapter 11 covers the 1990 and 1993 tax acts with few surprises. It turns
out that the tax changes involved in the acts were really boring. Chapter 12,
however, had me worried. The chapter discusses how economists fail to truly
agree on anything, 157 and thus appears to suggest that one should take all
expert opinion, presumably with the book's author excepted, with a grain of
salt. This is a tenuous conclusion. On the one hand, Graetz is certainly correct
that major issues in determining the sensitivity of economic behavior to
economic incentives have not been resolved by professionals. These
disagreements range from the effects of various government programs and
taxes on saving and labor supply, to the burden of corporate taxes, to the
effects of the overall level of taxes on economic growth. On the other hand,
there is much that economists do agree on, and the type of discussion found in
this chapter is often prelude to an author making a proposal that lacks any
economic sense. Fortunately, Graetz does not fall prey to that trap, but it takes
the rest of the book to be sure!
Chapter 12 also discusses the problems created by what Graetz calls
"paint-by-numbers" lawmaking. In a nutshell, the claim is that, by focusing on
short-run (five-year) budgetary consequences, Congress ignores more noble,
disciplined, cost-benefit approaches to policy making. This criticism is
certainly valid, but it is hard to know what policy arrangement would work to
make Congress better focused. At the very least, a five-year budget window is
more effective than a single-year constraint, although a longer window could
be even more useful. But it does seem clear that the budget rules have been
effective at least in restraining Congress to some degree.
In summary, the second section of the book adds useful political,
historical, and institutional detail to the economic analysis of the first section.
My criticisms of Graetz's proposals regarding the capital gains tax and the
budget rules notwithstanding, this section of the book provides a strong basis
for considering tax reform solutions subject to political and other constraints
imposed by the real world.
III. The Fall?
The final section of the book examines solutions to the tax system's woes.
157. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 177-82.
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A. Four Proposals for Fundamental Reform
One approach to tax reform is to throw out the existing system and
replace it with a new one. There are four main proposals for such fundamental
reform. The national retail sales tax taxes all sales between businesses and
households. 158 The VAT requires each business-corporate as well as non-
corporate-to pay taxes on the difference between gross revenue from sales
and the costs of materials, services, and capital goods.159 This difference-
wages, interest, and profits-represents the value added by the firm. Because
the final retail sales price of a good is simply the sum of the value added to
that good by each firm at each stage of production, the VAT covers the same
net tax base as a retail sales tax. The flat tax operates in the same way as the
VAT, except that wages are subtracted from the business-level tax base, and
wages are taxed at the individual level with personal exemptions provided.
Without the personal exemptions, the flat tax has the same base as the VAT or
the retail sales tax. 160 The "USA" tax is modeled more closely on the income
tax. Under this system, households determine their tax liability by calculating
their income and then subtracting their net saving. The difference is
consumption, and is taxed at graduated rates. The USA tax retains a number
of current deductions and credits, and includes a business-level VAT. Both the
individual- and business-level USA tax allow refundable credits for payroll
taxes paid.
16
B. Analysis of the Proposals
All four plans represent taxes on consumption, even if they appear to tax
something else entirely. Thus, the main differences between the plans involve
(a large number of) administrative issues, the presence of exemptions,
deductions and credits, and the rate structure. In short, evaluating such taxes is
a daunting task. Graetz breaks the task down into several smaller chunks.
158. See id. at 99.
159. See id. The VAT described here is a subtraction-method VAT. An alternative type of VAT,
using the credit-method, places a tax on gross sales of the firm, but allows a credit for the VATs paid by
the firm in purchasing material goods, services and capital goods. If all goods are taxed at the same rate,
the subtraction- and credit-method approaches yield identical results. However, when tax rates vary
across goods or producers, only the credit-method approach can determine tax liabilities appropriately.
See, e.g., id. at 199-200.
160. See, e.g.,id. at217-19.
161. For further descriptions, see Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 1, 4, 8-13 (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale eds., 1996).
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1. Fairness
The first question Graetz addresses is whether consumption taxes are fair.
A common fairness argument for consumption taxes is that while income
taxes tax people on what they add to society, consumption taxes tax people on
what they consume, and therefore what they take away from society. Graetz
argues that this reasoning contains a fundamental flaw in that it assumes a
common pool of resources from which members of society make their
consumption choices. 162 In fact, he argues, the institution of private property
implies that my consumption of my resources does not reduce your
consumption of your resources. 
163
A second measure of fairness is the ability to pay taxes. This
measurement is complicated: There are questions about both what should be
taken into account in measuring ability to pay and the appropriate time
horizon. Consumption tax advocates note that, under certain theories of
economic behavior, consumption is proportional to lifetime income. 164 More
generally, over the course of one's life, consumption should roughly equal
lifetime income. Thus, they argue, consumption is a good measure of ability
to pay. Opponents note, however, that the presence of borrowing constraints
implies that current income may be a more appropriate measure of ability to
pay for some households than lifetime income. 165 This is an especially
important problem when the half-life of tax policy can be brutally short.
Another rarely-discussed problem is that not all "consumption" necessarily
represents ability to pay; a cancer patient going through a divorce has very
high consumption expenditures, but may not be in a good position to bear a
heavy tax burden in the same year.
162. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 202.
163. See id. at 222. An interesting implication of this argument is that it makes more sense to tax
consumption in situations where resources are pooled, say in a kibbutz, than in an atomized, private
economy.
164. See, e.g., DON FULLERTON & DIANE LIM ROGERS, WHO BEARS THE LIFETIME TAX BURDEN?,
17-21 (1993) (arguing that snapshot views of tax incidence overstate the regressivity of consumption
taxes); HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 479 (4th ed. 1995) (arguing that lifetime consumption as a
proportion of income is constant over all income levels); William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or
Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1175 (1974) (noting the theoretical
equivalence of lifetime consumption and income).
165. See, e.g., Malcolm Gillis et al., Indirect Consumption Taxes: Common Issues and
Differences Among the Alternative Approaches, 51 TAX L. REV. 725, 739 n.41 (1996) (noting liquidity
problems with life-cycle theory of income and consumption); Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax
Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1995) ("in the absence of perfect capital markets, high lifetime
income may not reflect high current ability to pay taxes, particularly when liquidity constraints are
serious"); Stephen P. Zeldes, Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: An Empirical Investigation, 97 J.
POL. ECON. 305 (1989) (suggesting that liquidity constraints limit consumption for a significant portion
of the population).
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An additional argument against consumption taxes relates to their
potential for regressive impact. Because household saving rates tend to rise
with income, 166 households with low income tend to consume a higher portion
of their income than do households in higher income brackets. Thus,
consumption taxes will look more regressive when examined from the
perspective of a household's annual income than from the perspective of a
household's lifetime income.
Other countries have dealt with these consumption tax problems by
exempting food, clothing, housing, or other necessities from the tax base.
1 67
This turns out, however, to be quite inefficient because high-income
households tend to consume more of each of these goods (although with a
smaller proportion of their income) than do poor households. 68 A more direct
way to introduce progressivity is to provide an exemption, as in the flat tax.
This limits the size of the effective exemption that high-income households
can obtain and does not distort household choices about the consumption of
various goods.
Ultimately, Graetz does not clearly determine which tax is fairer. He
retreats to the assertion that taxing only consumption strikes him as unfair.
While it might, indeed, be unfair, one would hope for a stronger case here. On
firmer ground, Graetz notes that it is hard to obtain significant progressivity at
the top end without a tax on income or wealth, and that achieving fairness was
the main reason to tax income and tax it at progressive rates in the first place.
It is important to note that the debate about whether income or
consumption provides a fairer tax base is completely independent of whether
taxes should be proportional or progressive. Graetz makes a strong case for
progressive taxation, based largely on arguments put forth in his 1983 article
on the estate tax. 69 He argues that market returns do not necessarily represent
fair outcomes because incomes derive from, among other things, fluctuations
in consumer tastes, joint use of products, the functioning of government
institutions, luck, and inheritances (the latter broadly defined to include
166. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 422-23 (15th ed.
1995) (explaining how consumption patterns vary across income levels); Fred S. McChesney, Problems
in Calculating and Awarding Compensatory Damages for Wrongful Death Under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 36 EMORY L.J. 149, 171 (1987) (using tabular data to argue that savings rates vary
systematically with income, that savings rates are negative at lower levels of income, and that savings
begin to accumulate only as incomes exceed $20,000).
167. See generally CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF ADOPTING A VALUE-ADDED
TAX (1992).
168. See, e.g., David F. Bradford, What Are Consumption Taxes and Who Pays Them?, 39 TAX
NOTES 383, 389-90 (1988) (noting that exempting items such as clothing may actually make
consumption taxes more regressive).
169. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 223-26. See generally Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate
Tax, Not Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259 (1983).
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transfers of cash, education, and personality). Thus, even if the market
functions perfectly, Graetz argues, "the ethical justification for its
distributions of income and wealth would be dubious." 170 Moreover, he
argues, markets often do not operate perfectly-legal barriers to entry,
political influence, lack of equal opportunity, and other impediments may
occur.
It is worth noting that even the "flat" tax is progressive. Because of the
exemption, average tax rates rise with income (above the exemption level)
even though marginal tax rates do not. Thus, while Graetz's arguments for
progressivity are convincing, they do not dictate the optimal degree of
progressivity.
On the other hand, there is no particular reason to have only one positive
tax rate. Some flat tax proponents have argued that it is immoral to have more
than one rate, t71 but this argument is quite strange. After all, given the
existence of an exemption, the flat tax itself has two rates-zero for income
below the exemption level, and the flat tax rate for income above the
exemption level. Suppose a flat tax with an exemption level of $30,000 is
implemented, with a tax rate of 20% on all wages above that amount. It is
hard to see anything immoral about starting from that system and then
changing it so that, for example, the first $20,000 of taxable wages are taxed
at 10% while wages above that amount remain taxed at 20%.
The fairness of particular consumption taxes depends not only on
theoretical considerations but on the actual distributional impacts. Both the
flat tax and the retail sales tax (with or without exemptions for a base amount
of consumption) would generate large tax cuts for the wealthiest families.'7 2
The USA tax, on the other hand, would be very close to being distributionally
neutral across income classes.'
73
2. Complexity
After considering the fairness of consumption taxes, Graetz turns to the
issue of their simplicity. Consumption taxes could, in principle, be simpler
than the existing income tax. On the other hand, the income tax could itself
exist in a much simpler form than it currently does.
170. GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 224.
171. See Alice Gresham Bullock, Taxes, Social Policy, and Philanthropy: The Untapped
Potential of Middle- and Low-Income Generosity, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 325, 337 (1997)
(noting that John Stuart Mill found progressive income taxation to be "graduated robbery"). See
generally Dan T. Smith, High Progressive Tax Rates: Inequity and Immorality?, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 451
(1968).
172. See GRAETZ supra note 2, at 262.
173. See, e.g., Gale et al., supra note 161, at 281, 318.
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Complexity in the existing system arises from several sources. For
example, the taxation of business income, broadly defined to include the self-
employed, raises several issues. In particular, debate is invoked by the
treatment of inventories and depreciation, the AMT, distinguishing capital
from current expenses, distinguishing business from personal expenses, and
limits on tax arbitrage.' 74 Some of these complexities could be eliminated by
moving to a flat tax. A major source of simplification in the income tax or the
consumption tax would be to tax all capital income at the business level.
The enactment of social policy through the tax code is another source of
complexity. This is achieved through such items as the dependency
exemptions; child-care credits; the EITC; and deductions for mortgage
interest, charitable contributions, pension contributions, health care, fringe
benefits, etc. 175
Returning to Joe and Jane Six-Pack, Graetz notes that they would suffer
many of the same problems under the flat tax that they do now. Along these
lines, Alan Feld illustrates that the flat tax will either generate complicated
business transactions to skirt the rules or complicated tax laws to reduce the
gaming possibilities. 176 Graetz notes that the nonconformity between state and
federal taxes might remain a source of complexity even after fundamental tax
reform. 177
Graetz also notes that some analysts believe the USA tax is virtually
unworkable due to implementation complexities and tax-planning
opportunities.178 The retail sales tax also poses substantial administrative
barriers. As Graetz notes, the combined federal-state sales tax rate would
likely be in excess of 30%. 179 At that rate, experience suggests that
enforcement becomes quite difficult. Joel Slemrod surveys the evidence on
these issues and pronounces both plans nonadministrable at accepted
standards of equity and intrusiveness.'
80
3. Savings and Economic Growth
The third issue addressed in this section of the book is the extent to which
consumption tax plans would affect saving and economic growth. Here,
Graetz notes a wide variety of estimates among professional economists, but
gives no sense of why these estimates vary.
174. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 230-32.
175. See id. at 226-32.
176. See Alan L. Feld, Living with the Flat Tax, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 603, 603-17 (1995).
177. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 261-62.
178. See id. at 227.
179. See id. at 205-06.
180. See Joel Slemrod, Which Is the Simplest Tax System of Them All?, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM supra note 161, at 355, 370, 377.
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Much more can be said about the effects of tax reform on economic
growth if one is willing to look more closely at empirical evidence. For
example, David Altig and his colleagues run simulations of numerous models
of tax reform. 181 They show first that a flat consumption tax with no personal
exemptions, no transition relief, and no product exemptions could raise the
size of the economy by 9% after ten years (and 11% in the long run).' 82 The
required tax rate would be just under 15% to start with and eventually fall to
about 12.5%. 18 These growth effects are huge, relative to the likely impact of
other policies, but the policy is not likely to be enacted-even advocates of
reform acknowledge the need for personal exemptions. 184 The flat tax allows
for these exemptions, but that raises the required tax rate. Altig and his
colleagues estimate that the flat tax with exemptions would raise national
income by 4% after ten years (and 6% in the long run), with tax rates starting
at 21-22% and falling eventually to 19.4%.185 Thus, allowing for the personal
exemption cuts their estimated growth effect in half. However, 4% is still
sizable growth over ten years.
The pure flat tax is not politically realistic either. Almost everyone-
including the Kemp Commission-acknowledges the need for transition relief
for business.' 8 6 One component of transition relief would allow firms to
continue taking depreciation deductions on investments that were made before
tax reform.' 87 Altig and his colleagues estimate that allowing for this type of
relief reduces the long-run growth effect to 1.8% after 10 years, and 3.5% in
the long run.'
88
These estimates indicate that a huge source of variation in growth effect
estimates is the realism of the reform under consideration. Simply allowing
for personal exemptions and transition relief reduces the ten-year impact of
tax reform on economic growth by 80%, from a 9% increase to a 1.8%
increase. 189 Even the 1.8% rate, however, may be larger than would be
generated by current political proposals. Altig's estimates use smaller personal
exemption levels than Armey's flat tax proposal; they do not include Armey's
child exemptions; and their assumed transition relief does not include any
181. See ALTIG ET AL., supra note 146.
182. See id. at 4, 20-21.
183. See id. at 20-21.
184. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMM'N ON ECON. GROWTH AND TAX REFORM, supra note 13, at 21.
185. See ALTIG ET AL., supra note 146, at 4, 22-23.
186. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMM'N ON ECON. GROWTH AND TAX REFORM, supra note 13, at 98-
102.
187. See, e.g., Aaron & Gale, supra note 1, at 249-50.
188. See ALTIG ET AL., supra note 146, at 23-24 (noting long-run effects of transition relief).
Compare id. at 44 tbl.5 (under a pure consumption tax, output in the year 2005 is 1.09 times what it
otherwise would have been), with id. at 48 tbl.7 (under a flat tax with transition relief, output in the year
2005 is only 1.018 times what it otherwise would have been).
189. See Aaron & Gale, supra note 1, at 258-59.
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grandfathering of existing interest deductions on loans taken out by businesses
and net loss carryforwards. 190 If adjustments are made for either higher
personal exemptions or more generous transition relief or both, the implied
growth effect would be even less than 1.8% over 10 years, and could plausibly
be negative.
That is not, however, the end of the story. For similar reasons, the
mortgage interest deduction might be grandfathered (or actually retained) in a
flat tax. After all, the political argument would go, if major corporations are
able to deduct interest payments on their old debt, why shouldn't
homeowners? As another example, eliminating the deductibility of health
insurance payments would cause an estimated 6-14 million person increase in
the number of uninsured households and a 21% increase in the price of health
insurance. 191 Politicians and voters may well support retention of the health
insurance deductions rather than face these sacrifices. Similar stories might be
told about other important tax expenditures, such as the charitable
contributions deductions, the EITC, the deductibility of state and local income
and property taxes for households, and the deductibility of state and local
taxes and payroll taxes for businesses. If all of these deductions are allowed,
the flat tax rate would have to rise to about 31% to replace current income and
corporate tax revenues.192
No formal estimates predict the growth effects of these changes.
However, if raising the consumption tax from 14% to 24% causes the 10-year
growth effect to fall from 9% to 1.8%, it seems reasonable to presume that
raising it another seven percentage points could wipe out all of the remaining
1.8% growth effect. Thus, economists can plausibly say both that a pure
consumption tax reform would raise the size of the economy by 9% over 10
years, and that a consumption tax reform that allows for personal exemptions,
transition relief, and retention of a few popular deductions would have
virtually zero effect on growth.
4. Political Dimensions
Finally, Graetz deals nicely with a variety of more outlandish claims put
forth by advocates of tax reform. As he writes, the claim that tax reform
would eliminate the role of tax lobbyists is "palpable nonsense."' 93 Tax
reform would simply start the lobbying game over again from a different
starting point. Advocates also claim that having a single tax rate, as in the flat
tax, would help government stay small, because to raise one person's rate
190. See ALTIG ETAL., supra note 146, at 5-18.
191. See Aaron & Gale, supra note 1, at 235, 252-53.
192. See id. at 250. This rate does not allow for transition relief for interest payments.
193. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 278.
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would mean raising everyone's rate. This assertion embodies a view of
politics that the rich and poor must band together to stop the power of
government. A more likely scenario, to my mind, is that rich, poor, and other
taxpayers battle each other to extract resources from government. If so, the
flat tax provides no guarantee against bigger government or more taxes in the
future. It would therefore be straightforward to add a second, third, or more
rates onto the base employed by the flat tax. Adding graduated tax rates to the
flat tax is precisely what is offered in Bradford's X-tax.194 Moreover, the VAT
in Europe and the social security tax in the United States are both flat rate
taxes that have increased dramatically over the past several decades. 95 Thus,
although the goal of tax reformers may be to reduce the size of government, as
discussed above, this goal may backfire.
5. What's Missing?
I would add a few additional substantive points to Graetz's analysis of
consumption taxes. First, Graetz notes that flat tax advocates do not want to
call their tax a consumption tax. This stems partly from simple confusion-
many flat tax advocates truly seem not to understand that their tax is a
consumption tax. But advocates may also feel that taxing income still
resonates well with the public. The cloaking of consumption taxes in income
tax garb, however, is odd because the difference between a pure consumption
tax and pure income tax is actually surprisingly small. For example, the flat
tax allows firms to expense all current investment. If the flat tax instead only
allowed firms to deduct their investment expenditures over time in accordance
with economic depreciation, the flat tax would be an income tax. That is, the
difference between a consumption and an income tax boils down to the tax
treatment of depreciation. Yet, I would venture that anyone who favors the
flat-tax-with-expensing over the current system would also favor the flat-tax-
with-economic-depreciation over the current system, and that anyone who
favors the current system over the flat consumption tax would also favor the
current system over the flat income tax. If so, the debate is not really about
income versus consumption taxes-that is, it is not about the tax base, but
rather about other features of tax reform.
What, then, are those other features that galvanize both support and
opposition to the flat tax? In my view, they are: flat rates (that is, a large
reduction in the taxes paid by the top income classes), the elimination of
194. See Bradford, supra note 168, at 384-87.
195. See Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, Let's Revamp the Tax Code-But How?, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 15, 1998, at A22.
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social policy through the tax code, the integration of corporate and personal
taxes, and differences in the point of collection of the tax.
Another useful addition to Graetz's analysis of consumption taxes would
have been to illustrate how the various plans do or do not resolve the five
major problems in the income tax that Graetz identified earlier in the book. As
an example, I focus here on the flat tax, as that seems to me to be the most
plausible alternative.
First, as noted above, the marriage tax would continue to exist under the
flat tax. Moreover, the flat tax would effectively renegotiate most divorce
agreements in the country. Currently, alimony is deductible for the payer and
taxable to the recipient. 196 The flat tax would reverse the situation so that
alimony would be neither deductible for the payer nor taxable to the
recipient. 1
97
Tax sheltering would also continue under the flat tax, but could take a
very different form. Potential opportunities for sheltering abound,' 98 but one
stands out. Under the flat tax, interest income is not taxed and interest
payments are not deductible, but receipts from sales are taxed and purchases
of goods are deductible. 199 This situation implies that any firm with funds
coming in will try to label those funds as "interest" and any firm with funds
going out will try to label those funds as "purchases." These incentives will
have no effect on domestic inter-business transactions, as long as both firms
face the same rates and base. However, in interactions between domestic
businesses and individuals, government, non-profits, and especially foreign
businesses or individuals, there will be substantial opportunities for tax
avoidance.
Compliance could improve somewhat due to the structure of the flat tax,
both because a higher proportion of the tax is collected at the business level
and because rates are lower. However, Graetz presents a strong argument that
increased auditing and enforcement would help compliance even more, with
or without the flat tax.200 Inflation would in general no longer be an issue.
Whether the flat tax would end up simple or not is discussed above.20 1
196. See, e.g., William G. Gale et al., Voices, in THE FLAT TAX PRIMER 127, 129-30 (Douglas
Sease & Tom Herman eds., 1996).
197. See, e.g., id.
198. See generally Alan L. Feld, Living with the Flat Tax, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 603, 605-07 (1995).
199. See id. at 603-04.
200. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 98-107.
201. See supra subsection II.B.2.
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C. Graetz 's Proposals
In the last two chapters, Graetz proposes his own solutions. His first batch
of solutions would modify the existing tax structure and proceeds as follows.
1. Specific Modifications
Graetz's specific recommendations focus on increasing savings rates and
simplifying the tax code.202 Saving could be influenced by restraining interest
deductions, focusing particularly on altering the treatment of home equity
loans, enhancing pension coverage, creating IRAs that allow deductions for
amounts of saving in excess of stated floors, and integrating corporate and
personal taxes. Simplification could be achieved by both increasing the
standard deduction and accepting "rough justice" in various settings, such as
the treatment of interest income and expense; the definition of a dependent;
and deductions for work expenses; commuting; and child care.203 The
treatment of inventory, pensions, and rules for small businesses could also be
simplified dramatically. State and local taxes could be induced to conform
with federal taxes, perhaps by allowing deductions only for states who key off
of the federal form. Congress could further simplify by limiting filing
requirements for many households to spare them "the costs and agony of
filing tax returns,, 204 and by converting the EITC to a social security tax
credit. Oh, and by the way, social security should be partially privatized 205 and
the estate tax should be either converted to an inheritance tax or "retained and
improved" in some unstated way.206
These tax proposals are mainly sensible; 2°7 none are novel. It would be
nice to stimulate saving through the income tax. My sense, however, is that
doing so has proven quite difficult, and some of the options presented-for
example, IRAs that subsidize saving above one threshold and below
another-are complicated. Enhancing pension coverage is a terrific idea, and
if we knew how, we could do it. It would also be nice to simplify the tax code.
Many of the simplifications proposed involve trade-offs, however, and the
effort to provide rough justice will not sit well with those whose taxes go up
as a result. For example, "simplifying" the EITC by converting it into a
payroll tax credit would cost recipients a large chunk of the benefits currently
202. See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 245-49, 258-61.
203. See id. at 258-61.
204. Id. at 259-60.
205. See id. at 249-58.
206. Id. at 267-68.
207. I will avoid discussion of social security.
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208provided. This is not to say we should not try, but rather that my sense of
the previous attempts is that we have had little success in the past.
2. Comprehensive Reforms
Graetz's second set of proposals is for more comprehensive tax reform.
209
Graetz proposes to implement a national VAT that would raise half as much
revenue as the current corporate and individual income tax.210 The funds
would be used to cut the corporate tax rate in half, and to convert the income
tax into an instrument that only taxes the high end of the income distribution
and does so at a flat rate. The proposal is worth taking seriously, and at a
general level, several points can be made.
My interpretation of this proposal is that Graetz does not want to get rid
of the income tax entirely because of fairness considerations, but does not feel
that the problems with the income tax can be solved in any clean way. Thus,
the solution is to keep the income tax but limit its applicability to only the
highest income groups. Lowering and flattening the income tax rate would
reduce some current sources of complexity and eliminate others.
The plan offers many advantages. It would eliminate the income tax for
over 90% of current filers. 211 It would impose a broad-based consumption tax
that could be implemented at the revenue levels needed.21 2 It would retain
both progressivity and the appearance of progressivity.213 It would eliminate
the marriage tax, if the exemptions for single people in the marriage tax were
set at half the exemptions for married couples.2 14 Capital gains would be taxed
at the same rate as other income215 (violating Graetz's earlier suggestion that
they be taxed at the revenue-maximizing rates). The proposal is also
consistent with international aspects of taxation: The ability to impose steep
capital income taxes is limited by globalization of world capital markets.
216
208. See, e.g., Nancy J. Altman, The Reconciliation of Retirement Security and Tax Policies: A
Response to Professor Graetz, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1419, 1435-37 (1988) (arguing that the EITC can
offset more taxes facing the poor than a payroll tax credit can, and that it better targets poor individuals);
see also George K. Yin, Accommodating the "Low-Income " in a Cash-Flow or Consumed Income Tax
World, 2 FLA. TAX REv. 445, 479 (1995) (noting that a payroll tax credit withheld throughout the year
might be less useful for beneficiaries than the EITC, which delivers advance payments).
209. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 262-66.
210. See id. at 264-66.
211. Seeid. at264-65.
212. See id. at 264-66.
213. See id. at 266.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 271.
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States face some of the same problems and have relied more on consumption
taxes, as have European countries.217
The plan also has negative aspects. It could be claimed that the proposal
combines the worst aspects of both systems-the regressivity and potential
complexity of the VAT and the complexity of the income tax. The proposal
still needs to address low-income working households that currently receive
the EITC. Providing a rebate of payroll taxes as a substitute for the EITC
would significantly reduce the incentive to work that the EITC currently
provides. 218 A better way may be to provide household-level demogrants, a
point to which I return below. The complexity of the income tax is worst at
the high end, the protestations of the Six-Packs notwithstanding, and would
remain. But it might be possible to simplify the income tax considerably if it
only applied to a small minority of households. And if rates were lower than
they currently are, it may be even easier to simplify. The proposal would not
stimulate much saving or investment, but note from the discussion above that
plausible versions of the flat tax are unlikely to do so either.219 There likely
would be reductions in pension coverage and health insurance coverage, both
because corporations would face sharply lower rates and because most
households would no longer face income tax incentives to participate in such
programs. These reductions would likely be smaller than the ones occurring
under the flat tax.
By stipulating that more than 90% of current filers would no longer pay
income tax, the proposal thus eliminates many items that are currently
considered "problems" of the income tax. But many of these-for example,
subsidies for housing, charity, and child care-appear likely to show up again
as either spending, tax, or regulatory programs.
22°
Graetz proposes a tax on adjusted gross income, but my guess is that
deductions for mortgage interest, charity, and state and local taxes would
remain. The first and third were in the original income tax of 1913, and the
second was established shortly thereafter.221 All three were established when
the income tax applied to only a tiny fraction of the population. Including
these items might be required to help defuse political opposition.
A VAT on the order of 15-20%, which I view as a more likely outcome
than 10% for reasons discussed below, would impart a significant effect on
the price level. Increases in VATs, whether of a stand alone nature or as a
217. See, e.g., id. at 199.
218. See, e.g., Stacey Dickert et al., Taxes and the Poor: A Microsimulation Study of Implicit
and Explicit Taxes, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 621, 636 (1994).
219. See supra subsection 1II.B.3.
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replacement for existing income taxes, have tended to raise the price level in
222Britain and other European countries.
It should be emphasized that the proposal is only briefly sketched out. It is
more of an idea than a fleshed-out proposal. This was apparently a deliberate
strategy by the author, aimed at getting people interested in the idea of a
VAT-plus-income tax, without burdening them with complicating and
deadening details.
On the other hand, the vagueness of the proposal will tend to make the
proposal look good relative to realistic, detailed alternatives. All tax policies
look "cleaner" and simpler when discussed in the abstract. In tax policy, the
author would agree, the devil is in the details. It will therefore be hard for
readers to evaluate the proposal when the book only spends four pages laying
it out.
The vagueness also leaves important questions unanswered. Which goods
or services would be exempt from the VAT? Would there be family-level
demogrants? Which deductions would remain in the income tax? Ultimately,
it is not at all clear what is actually being proposed.
3. Obstacles to Graetz's Comprehensive Reform
There is a silver lining, however. If the author does not fill in the details,
he leaves room for others to do so. So here is one effort to fill in the details
and to do so in a way that takes seriously the political constraints that Graetz
emphasizes throughout his book.
Graetz's proposal is for a 10% VAT that would replace half of all
revenues from personal income taxes.223 An additional 2% VAT would allow
the corporate tax rate to be cut in half.2 24 The personal income tax would be
modified to allow "exemption of all tax returns below $75,000 of adjusted
gross income combined with a flat-rate 21% tax on the total adjusted gross
income of returns above $75,000.,,225
There are two major problems with this specification. First, the proposal
would tax the total adjusted gross income (AGI) of returns above $75,000.226
This would not happen. One cannot exempt households with income below
$75,000 and then tax all of the AGI of households above $75,000. Doing so
would mean that a household with income of $74,999 would pay no income
tax, while a household with income of one dollar more would pay $15,750.
222. See Henry J. Aaron, THE VALUE-ADDED TAX: LESSONS FROM EUROPE 1, 12-13 (Henry J.
Aaron ed., 1981).
223. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 264-65.
224. See id. at 264, 266.
225. Id. at 265.
226. Id.
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The only practical way to tax only those households with income above
$75,000 is to grant a $75,000 exemption (or deduction) and only tax the AGI
in excess of $75,000, rather than total AGI. Unfortunately, that reduces the tax
base significantly and hence raises the required tax rate.
Second, the tax rates quoted by Graetz are unlikely to raise sufficient
revenue. For example, to raise half of 1993 income tax revenues with a tax on
all AGI above $75,000 would have required a tax rate of 37%.227 If itemized
deductions for mortgage interest, charitable deductions, and state and local
taxes were retained for high-income groups, the required rate would have
risen to about 50%. If "only" a $50,000 exemption were provided, the
revenues could have been made up with a 25% flat tax on all AGI above
$50,000. If itemized deductions were retained for the high-income groups, a
tax rate of about 32% would have been required. 2  With a $50,000
exemption, 20% of current filers would have been required to file returns.
229
To replace half of the revenues from personal and corporate income taxes,
a VAT would have to raise 5. 1% of GDP in revenues, based on the average of
U.S. data from 1990 to 1997.230 What VAT rate would be required to replace
half of these revenues? According to Vito Tanzi, European countries raise
7.17% of GDP in broad-based VATs with an average rate of 17.2%.23t This
implies that raising 5.1% of GDP would require a rate of 12%, if the VAT
were structured like European VATs. A second way to estimate the VAT rate
is to note that Feenberg and his colleagues show that replacing the personal,
corporate, and estate tax with a retail sales tax that taxed all plausibly taxable
private consumption would require a tax rate of 17% for a pure retail sales tax
and 29% if demogrants equal to the poverty line were provided for each
232household. Since retail sales taxes and VATs tax the same net tax base, the
VAT rate would be 8.5% without demogrants or 14.5% with demogrants if the
VAT taxed all items.233
227. This figure, and the others in this paragraph, are based upon the author's calculations using
data from Tax Statistics (visited June 5, 1998) <http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/prod/taxstats> (calculations
on file with the author).
228. The required rates with itemized deductions depend on the $75,000 allowance being an
exemption. If it is instead structured as a standard deduction, the required rate would probably be much
closer to the required rate with no deductions.
229. This figure is based upon the author's calculations using data from Tax Statistics, supra
note 227 (calculations on file with the author).
230. This figure is based upon the author's calculations using data from Tax Statistics, supra
note 227 (calculations on file with the author).
231. See VITO TANZI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 50 (1995).
232. See Feenberg et al., supra note 116, at 52-57.
233. These claims, and those in the next paragraph, are based upon the author's calculations
using data from Tax Statistics, supra note 227, and from Feenberg et al., supra note 116, at 52-65, 70-
74, 78-81 (calculations on file with the author).
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Putting these figures together illustrates some of the trade-offs involved.
Suppose the income tax placed a 21% tax on AGI in excess of $75,000 and
allowed itemized deductions for mortgage, charity, and state and local taxes.
This would only raise about 21% of existing income tax revenues, though, and
would require a VAT rate of about 21% if there were a demogrant and all
consumption were in the tax base. The VAT rate would rise to about 26% if
an additional 20% of consumption were exempted for social policy, tax
administration, fairness, or other reasons.
These figures may fundamentally alter the character of Graetz's proposal.
Or they may not. It is hard to know in the absence of more details. To be sure,
these recalculations are not a reason to jettison the proposal; however, it is
important to have a sense of how the numbers work out rather than just the
idea behind the proposal, even where the idea is a solid one.
4. Political Reform
Graetz does not stop at tax reform. In the last chapter, he argues cogently
that the political process itself needs reform if we are to create sensible and
durable policies in taxation and other areas. He notes four ways to inhibit
congressional misbehavior. He argues that the first way, enacting
constitutional amendments, is difficult and should not be undertaken
lightly.234 The second way would be for the judicial branch to strike down
legislation as unconstitutional.235 Graetz seems to want the judicial branch to
attack tax policy in this way, but acknowledges that it is not likely to happen
soon. 23 6 Third, Congress could constrain actions of future congresses via
rules, for example, that regulate budget outcomes, or that require a 60%
majority to raise taxes. 237 The problem here is that Congress can and has voted
to override such rules at various times.238 Finally, Congress could revise
campaign finance rules.239 Graetz and many other knowledgeable observers
argue that the pressure of financing expensive campaigns has polluted the
political process. 240 In that regard, Graetz notes that lower tax rates reduce the
234. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 279, 281.
235. See id. at 279.
236. See id. at 285-86.
237. See id. at 279-80.
238. See id. at 286.
239. See id. at 288-92.
240. See id. at 288-90; John Bonifaz & Jamin Raskin, The Constitutional Imperative and
Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1160 (1994); Marty
Jezer & Ellen Miller, Money Politics: Campaign Finance and the Subversion of American Democracy, 8
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 467 (1994); Richard Lacayo, Tax Cuts: Who Will Get the
Breaks?, TIME, Jan. 8, 1996, at 30 (arguing that "special interests.., hold the pen at tax-writing time");
Gretchen Morgenson, Look Who's Running a Protection Racket, FORBES, Sept. 8, 1997, at 44 (arguing
that Congress uses tax policy to extort campaign contributions from businesses).
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incentive to lobby for tax breaks, but of course benefits to favored
constituencies can be passed along in many ways.
241
Although the chapter provides no ready answers, it provides a useful
purpose and concluding point: It brings the reader back to the political
environment in which tax reform ultimately will be considered. While it is
important to consider the theoretical basis of tax reform, it is impossible to
make adequate judgments about such policies without focusing on how the
reforms would actually work after they have been exposed to Congress, an
army of lobbyists, the tax shelter industry, and the American public. Unlike
many advocates .of comprehensive reform, Graetz should be congratulated for
taking both the principles and the practice of tax policy seriously.
241. See GAET-Z, supra note 2, at 277-98.
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